Abstract
Introduction
Trading Agent Competition Supply-Chain Management (TAC SCM) game presents a challenging scenario for agents to compete in a simulated market. A typical SCM game includes six participants and a duration of 220 virtual days (which lasts approximately 55 minutes in real time). Players procure computer components from suppliers in the component market, make production scheduling plan, produce computers and sell them in the computer market. In order to prevail in games, a team has to design a supply-chain system with appropriate procurement strategies, production plans, and bidding strategies to deal with the significant uncertainty involved in these games.
The TAC SCM games are characterized by the great uncertainty involved. These uncertainties are partially caused by the two simultaneous auctions in both the component market and the product market. The market price fluctuations and production capacity variability adds another level of complication to the decision making process. To cope with the significant uncertainty involved in the games, we employ a hybrid push-pull model to control the procurement, production and sales activities of the system. The push element in the system is based on the forecasts of future component consumption and production capacity, thereby making long-term planning feasible. Additionally, a push element is exploited to take advantage of the price discount for long-term procurement. On the other hand, in order to react and adapt to the market promptly, UAM-TAC also adopts a pull element catching feedback from market or downstream subsystems to control the activities in the upstream subsystems.
Meanwhile the effectiveness of decision making of the multi-agent system is significantly dependent on the strategies of other agents, thus, configuring other agents' behavior to simulate is critical [12] . Game theory is used as stability criteria to evaluate the plausibility of populations in many research of supply chain management and multi-agent system. The novelty of the proposed projected dynamic system [11] allows one to capture distinct flows, in particular, logistical and financial within the same network system. Moreover, we are able to observe, through a discrete-time process, how the prices as well as the commodity shipments are adjusted from iteration to iteration (time period to time period), until the equilibrium state is reached. The equilibrium prices and shipments, thus, offers a benchmark for the push and pull elements.
The challenges lie in how to organize the supply chain system in a way that it is both adaptive and responsive to changes in the environment without constant human guidance and intervention. To this end, the paper describes how UAM-TAC, a multi-agent based supply chain system that will be competed in TAC SCM 2007, is designed and driven by the hybrid push-pull model. We will focus on describing the design of each individual agent in UAM-TAC and the interactions among these agents. It consists of a pro-curement agent, an inventory agent, a production agent, a bidding agent, and a delivery agent. The procurement agent makes procurement plan and dynamically adjusts its plan based on feedback from other agents (the sales agent, etc.) and the market; the inventory agent manages the component and product inventory; the production agent schedules production activities to assemble components to computers; the bidding agent receives RFQs from customers, determines which subset of RFQs to bid on and how much the price is, and returns offers to the customers; and the delivery agent delivers the computers to customers in a timely fashion to avoid penalty.
The contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) a hybrid push-pull model to control the procurement, manufacturing and bidding activities and compete in a real competition environment. (2) a projected dynamic system to provide an equilibrium price and production quantity. (3) A multi-agent framework in which agents cooperate together to realize a hybrid push-pull model and work collectively to improve the system performance. By implementing a hybrid push-pull model based on a multi-agent framework, we are able to provide a system with a degree of continuity and autonomy. Experimental results illustrate that agents in our system are able to execute processes or carry out activities in a flexible and intelligent manner.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section ?? introduces the related work; Section 3 describes the motivation and specifics for the hybrid model; Section 4 presents the multi-agent framework of UAM-TAC and the agents in the framework, including description for these individual agents; Section 5 proposes Projected Dynamic System to obtain equilibrium solution; Section 6 presents the actual experimental results and provides analysis based on these results; Section 7 concludes the paper.
Related Work
The TAC SCM games have been held for five consecutive years. In this section, we review some related studies [8, 1, 7, 6, 15, 16] . In these related studies, virtually every aspect of the supply chain system has been studied. In particular, several production scheduling algorithms have been proposed [3] . The authors in [3] described a stochastic programming based order-to-build approach. Instead of just filling existing customer orders, they also fill offers based on a pricing model that associates probabilities with offers. Some researchers also studied TAC SCM from a game theoretical perspective. In order to prevail in a game, a supply chain system has to reason about the competitors' strategies, coordinate the actions of its own agents to adapt to the changing market. To reduce the effects of strategic play, in [8] , the authors designed a distributed feedback control approach which attempted to convert a game to a control problem. There have been considerable efforts on bidding strategies [2, 13, 1] . In [2] , the authors attempted to find an optimal bidding policy by extending the solution to the production scheduling problem based on the expected value method. The authors in [13] consider the problem of finding the set of bids to customers in simultaneous reverse auctions that maximizes the agent's expected profit. In order to achieve this, the authors compare several machine learning approaches to estimate the probability of bid acceptance.
In [1] , the authors considers the supplier offer acceptance problem as a multi-stage stochastic program. In addition, the authors suggest a heuristic for solving this problem using the rollout method, following one or two stage approximations of the multi-stage stochastic program as the base policy during rollouts. Recently, there has been a notable effort expended on the development of supply chain network models in order to formalize the study of interactions among distinct decisionmakers on multitiered networks in the form of supply chains who can compete within a tier of nodes but must cooperate between tiers of nodes [9, 5, 14] . In [10] , the authors focused on both the equilibrium as well as on the disequilibrium aspects of supply chains under competition.
In our paper, we focus on the control and coordination of the entire system, particularly on the interactions among the various agents in the multi-agent framework. The equilibrium prices and shipments serve as a benchmark for the push and pull elements. The design of each individual agent is described in order to offer a full picture of the system.
A Hybrid Push-Pull Model
Traditional supply-chain system strategies fall into either push or pull categories. However, the significant uncertainty involved in SCM games requires a more complicated model. The hybrid push-pull strategy described in this pa-per is our answer to address the uncertainty. In particular, this strategy is composed of a push element for the component procurement and a pull element for production as well as additional push/pull elements based on network equilibrium and other cooperative mechanisms. A push strategy for component procurement offers a buffer for possible supplier delivery delays and enables the agent to take the advantage of low component prices in the component procurement with a late due date. A pull strategy for the product production makes the agent more responsive to the market changes. Even though the push strategy for component procurement isn't as responsive, the risk-pooling effect across the product demands can mitigate its destructive impact. Based on this simple hybrid push-pull model which is realized through the interactions among the agents, our agent further improves the system performance. Fig. 1 demonstrates the information and control flow among the agents in a supply-chain system. The goal of these interactions is coordinate and control agents to react to the market changes promptly without human intervention. The interaction processes are detailed in the following sections.
The MultiAgent Framework and Agent Implementation
As a complete supply-chain system, UAM-TAC consists of a number of relatively independent decision makers, who cooperate together and work collectively to improve the system performance. In this section, we describe the decision making processes for these agents in UAM-TAC.
In particular, in Section 4.1, we introduce the procurement agent and focus on its variant-horizon based procurement strategy; Section 4.2 describes an on-demand production scheduling strategies used by the production agent; Section 4.3 presents the inventory agent and inventory management strategies; the delivery agent is briefly introduced in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 details the bidding and pricing models employed by the bidding agent.
A Variant-Horizon Procurement Strategy
A procurement process starts when a player sends RFQs to the suppliers. The suppliers return offers with delivery date and offer price based on the date and quantity information in the RFQs provided by the players, the suppliers' outstanding orders and their production capacity. Upon receipt of offers from suppliers, the procurement agent decides whether to accept the offers or not. In this section, we focus on two decision problems involved in the procurement process: (1) the delivery date and quantity information of the components in RFQs, (2) whether the price in the supplier offers are acceptable.
In making the first decision, the suppliers' pricing mechanism has to be taken into consideration. The suppliers' pricing formula is given as follows [4] in order to more accurately reflect the ratio between supply and demand in the market and avoid the notable "first-day procurement" phenomenon. The formula:
where P d,i is the offer price on day d for an RFQ due on day d+i+1; δ is the price discount factor and has a standard tournament value of 50%, P The procurements fall into two categories based on the delivery dates: short-term procurements and long-term procurements. Long-term procurements are made according to the estimation of component consumption and are commonly used in "push" systems. In real markets, the downside for long-term procurements is the difficulty of predicting the component demands due to the market variability. And because of the great uncertainty involved, players are wary of making long-term procurement because they risk the situations that the product prices fall below the costs. This cautiousness leads to the phenomenon that long-term procurement price is usually lower than short-term procurement price. The lower prices are the advantage of long-term procurements. On the other hand, short-term procurements allow players react to the product market changes rapidly. In particular, a pull system relies heavily on short-term procurements.
UAM-TAC adopts a variant-horizon procurement strategy based on this observation. We consider the two procurement types complementary and send RFQs with both types on a daily basis. The joint effect of short-term and long-term procurement is to keep a relatively constant component level to ensure the production activities. Particularly, a variant-horizon strategy is deployed in order to cope with the trade-off between long-term and short-term procurements. Specifically, for short term procurements, the delivery date is set as d + k, where d is the current date and k is a constant. The amount for short-term procurement is EC(d+k+m)−EC(d+k−1), where EC(d+k+m) is the expected consumption of component c by day d + k + m. In practice, we set both k and m as 5 so that the component orders can be received in time in order to suffice the short-term component demand. The expected inventory information, EC(k), is provided by the inventory agent. The procurement agent also sends out four long-term RFQs with variant delivery dates. The delivery dates are distributed randomly from d + 10 to d + 50.
Two strategies are used by the procurement agent to control procurement prices. The first strategy is to rank the offers by price and only select the two offers with lowest price to order instead of accepting all the offers returned from suppliers. However, in most cases long-term offers will be selected due to their price advantage compared to short-terms ones. This is undesirable because the shortage of short-term components leads to discontinuation of production. Therefore, short-term offers are given higher priority in the selection process. The second strategy used by UAM-TAC is to limit the component price within a profitable range. Therefore, if the offer price for a component i is above ρ * ij , the procurement agent j will simply reject the offer. The way of calculating ρ * ij will be presented in Section 5.
An On-demand Production Strategy
On a typical day, the production agent determines which types of computers and how many of them to assemble based on the availability of the components and market demand. The ways of organizing manufacturing falls into three categories: build-to-order, order-to-build [3] and mixed strategies.
This paper takes an on-demand production management strategy. The production is planned based on the inventory level of computers, instead of the outstanding orders. Particularly, in each simulation day, our agent makes its production decision following an iterative procedure. At the beginning of the procedure, it retrieves the current inventory information about the products and components. Then in each iteration, it tries to produce a batch of 5 units for the product that has the lowest inventory in the current iteration. If there are not enough components, our agent will produce as many units as possible with the given component inventory and move on to the product with the second lowest inventory. It continues the iteration until it either runs out of available production cycles or there are no components to produce one more unit of any product.
The Inventory Agent
The Inventory agent is mainly a bookkeeper for the component and product inventories. It also keeps tracking the average component and product costs and average product sales prices.
The main purpose of the inventory module is to provide a book keeper over time for the components and products. We define an inventory threshold for every component i and manufacture j as q ( ij) 1 * as defined in Section 5. This threshold is used as the expected demand per day for each component. The value of the threshold is decided by assuming a 100% utilization of the factory and the same number of units of each product to be produced each day. With this threshold, our agent can generate the projected demand for the components and then builds up an array as the projected supply for the components. The index of the array is the date. The value of one element in the array represents the total number of components will be available from the current date to the date indicated by the index of that element. This array is updated daily after the observation of the realized demands for the components.
The inventory module also provides information supporting procurement and sales decision. From the difference of the projected supply to the projected demand, our agent calculates the amount of components should be purchased to fulfill the projected demand before a specific date. It also calculates the combined total component inventory, which is the sum of the current on-hand component inventory plus the units of components in the product inventory. This information facilitates the procurement decision. To facilitate the sales decision, our agent calculates the net available product inventory, namely the current on-hand product inventory minus the outstanding customer orders.
Delivery Agent
Delivery agent controls the product delivery schedules. It gives priorities to the orders with earlier due dates. After it makes deliveries, it triggers the inventory agent to update the product inventory information. Our agent follows a simple rule for delivery. In each simulation day, it tries to deliver the customer order with the earliest due date in the active customer order set until it either runs out of inventory or there is no active customer order to make a delivery.
The Bidding Agent and its dynamic pricing strategy
In each day, a bidding agent receives RFQs from customers, selects a subset of the RFQs to bid, computes the bidding price and participates in the auctions. There are two important decisions a bidding agent has to make in this process: the bidding set selection and the bidding price computation.
A simple bidding set selection algorithm is used in UAM-TAC in order to focus ourselves on the bidding price computation algorithm. Specifically, UAM-TAC ranks the RFQs it receives in a decreasing order by the difference between the reserve price and the cost. It then selects the first P I * C RFQs to bid on, where P I is the current product inventory level and C is a constant. The pricing strategy of UAM-TAC is a feedback-based approach and will be described in details in the following sections.
In UAM-TAC, a sales target concept is introduced in the pricing model. A sales target for a particular product k on day d is noted as ST k,d , indicating the number of items the bidding agent intends to sell. The sales targets is determined ahead of the auctions. The bidding price for product k ρ k will be derived from the next section.
Projected Dynamic System
If we consider all the game participants, from component suppliers, manufacturers, till customers at demand markets, we can have a full picture of the system. In this section, we first identify the multilevel network structure of the problem and the corresponding flows and prices. In such network, UAM-TAC will be a node in the middle level. We then describe the underlying functions and the behavior of the various network agents, i.e., the component suppliers, the manufacturers, and the consumers located at the demand markets. The perspective is an equilibrium one. Since in an environment of competition, suppliers and manufacturers seek to maximize the profits whereas the consumers determine the manufacturer where the product can be obtained at the minimal unit cost, an equilibrium state which provides a valuable benchmark in an environment of competition can be obtained. Now, we depict the multilevel network system in a figure of which the logistical network is the bottom network, the financial network is the top network with flows of prices, and the informational network is the central network to store shipment and prices information (Fig. 2) . Specifically, the logistical network represents the commodity production outputs and the shipments between the network agents, that is, between the suppliers and the manufacturers, and the manufacturers and the demand markets.
We consider a logistical network of m suppliers located in the top tier, with a typical supplier denoted by i, n manufacturers located at the middle tier, with a typical manufacturer denoted by j, and o demand markets located at the bottom tier, with a typical demand market denoted by k. UAM-TAC is one node among the n manufacturers.
Let q 1 ij denote the nonnegative volume of commodity shipments between supplier i and manufacturer j and let q 2 jk denote the volume between manufacturer j and consumers at demand market k. We group the q + . From [10] , the vector X * = (Q 1 * , Q 2 * , ρ 2 * , ρ 3 * ) satisfying the equilibrium conditions will satisfy the variational inequality form:
where we identify an equilibrium point with a "*", d k is a demand function which can depend, in general, upon the entire vector of prices ρ 3 , c jk is the unit transaction cost of the manufacturers j associated with consumers at demand market k, f i is a production cost function faced by each supplier i, c ij is the transaction cost between each supplier and manufacturer pair, and c j is handling cost faced by a manufacturer j.
Experimental Results and analysis
In this section, we analyze UAM-TAC's experimental performance with teams that have published their binary programs SCM. UAM-TAC demonstrated considerable resilience and robustness to the changing market situation. It adapted reasonably well to the customers' demand and the variability of the component market. We ran several trial games and it appeared that the results have been quite consistent. Figs. 5 and 6 depict the beginning and the end of the game for a typical game selected from the game trials. The least time from the beginning of the game to the first day the products can be produced is 3 days because of the necessary negotiation time between the agent and the suppliers. Since UAM-TAC decides the quantity of customer RFQs to bid based on available product inventories, it's hard for it to offer products for sale at the beginning of the games. However, UAM-TAC keeps a relatively constant flow of components and products, thereby making it maintain sufficient inventory at the end of the games. Combining this fact with UAM-TAC's delivery strategy to deliver customer orders as early as possible, UAM-TAC generally fills more customer orders than other agents when the game approaches its end.
Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate the typical average component procurement price and quantity for each participant and Fig.  7 the typical average product sales price and quantity. As in Fig. 3 , FreeAgent orders much less components than other participants at a relatively higher price. By selling the product at a higher price, FreeAgent increases its profit of each product unit sold. But under the competition of other participants, its market share shrinks considerably. However, UAM-TAC tries to sustain a certain amount of market share with its bidding strategy. Thus it sells more products at a lower price. This demonstrates that the simulation reality makes UAM-TAC's method more favorable.
Conclusions
This paper describes the design of UAM-TAC, a multiagent based supply-chain system that will compete in TAC SCM (Trading Agent Competition Supply Chain Management) 2007. UAM-TAC consists of a procurement agent, an inventory agent, a production agent, a bidding agent and a delivery agent. Through the interactions among these agents, UAM-TAC established a hybrid push-pull model to control the supply chain system based on the equilibrium solutions of the supply chain system in which UAM-TAC is a node. The experimental game performance demonstrates that UAM-TAC is very responsive to the market price fluctuations and capacity variability. This is attribute to the observations that adjust its plan based on the feedback from the market quickly and they jointly control the component costs and selling price at a reasonable level.
